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________________ 
 
No. 17-1181 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
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JAMES GARNER, 
a/k/a ABD AL RAHMAN 
 
JAMES GARNER, 
         
      Appellant 
________________ 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00088-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 7, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ,  
and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
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William M. McSwain 
    United States Attorney 
Robert A. Zauzmer 
    Assistant United States Attorney, Chief of Appeals 
Joseph A. LaBar 
Office of the United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA  19106 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
________________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
indicted James Garner on charges of conspiracy to commit 
armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, attempted 
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence 
and aiding and abetting that crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2 & 924(c)(1).  A jury trial resulted in conviction on all 
charges, and the District Court sentenced Garner to a total of 
101 months’ imprisonment.  (His co-defendant Ruben 
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Marshall, who had not been charged with attempted bank 
robbery, was acquitted of all charges.)  Garner now appeals his 
conviction, arguing the evidence at trial was insufficient to 
establish either conspiracy or an attempt to commit armed bank 
robbery, and therefore the firearm charge fails as well.  His 
principal claim is that the chief witness against him was not 
credible, and he offers an alternate interpretation of the 
evidence at trial.  But we do not draw inferences in the 
defendant’s favor when reviewing for sufficiency of the 
evidence, and thus affirm. 
We review sufficiency of the evidence “in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether “any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 424–25 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 
(1979)).  In so doing, we must uphold the jury’s verdict unless 
it “fall[s] below the threshold of bare rationality.”  Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431 (quoting Coleman v. Johnson, 566 
U.S. 650, 656 (2012)).  “Reversing the jury’s conclusion 
simply because another inference is possible—or even equally 
plausible—is inconsistent with the proper inquiry for review of 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges.”  Id. at 432. 
Viewed in this light, the evidence at trial showed the 
following.  On February 6, 2015, Garner approached a man 
called Saber Saber after prayers concluded at their mosque 
with a “business opportunity” to be his getaway driver for a 
robbery of Apex Bank.  Garner went back inside the mosque 
to give Saber time to consider the offer.  The latter immediately 
went to his car and called FBI Special Agent Joshua Reed, for 
whom he acted as an informant.  The call went to voicemail, so 
Saber placed his phone in the cupholder, hoping to capture his 
conversation with Garner on Agent Reed’s voicemail.  Garner 
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left the mosque and entered Saber’s car to finish their 
conversation. 
Later that day Saber met with Agent Reed and agreed to 
participate in the latter’s investigation of Garner.  They made 
a recorded call to him to further discuss the robbery.  On 
another recorded call made February 9, Garner instructed 
Saber to surveil Apex Bank, and once that was completed, they 
would meet with a third individual, Ruben Marshall, to draw 
up a plan.  Saber did as Garner instructed and later met with 
Garner and Marshall to plan the robbery. 
Saber and Garner had several more recorded phone calls 
between February 10 and 12 outlining the robbery.  On the 
morning of February 12—the day before the planned 
robbery—Saber arrived to pick Garner up in his car.  Once 
Garner was inside the car, the FBI approached and arrested 
Garner and staged an arrest of Saber.  The FBI found on 
Garner’s person 17 small packets of crack cocaine, and in 
Saber’s car a backpack not present before Garner entered.  The 
backpack contained ski masks, a loaded gun, gloves, two-way 
radios, and ammunition. 
To prevail on a conspiracy charge, the Government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was “(1) a 
unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators[,] (2) an 
intent to achieve a common goal[,] and (3) an agreement to 
work together toward that goal.”  United States v. Pressler, 256 
F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2001).  Each of the elements may be 
proven “entirely by circumstantial evidence” so long as “the 
inferences drawn . . . have a logical and convincing connection 
to the facts established.”  United States v. Applewhaite, 195 
F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Casper, 
956 F.2d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 1992)).   
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Garner argues that there was no “unity of purpose” 
between himself and Saber, as he was merely “conning” Saber 
into believing he (Garner) intended to rob Apex Bank.  
Appellant’s Br. at 28.  But this is irrelevant.  The charged 
conspiracy was not between Garner and Saber, but between 
Garner and Marshall.  See Indictment as to James Garner, Doc. 
#11 at 1, United States v. Garner, No. 2:15-cr-00088-001 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 10, 2015).  Indeed, merely conspiring with Saber, a 
government informant, would not make Garner criminally 
liable.  This is the rule in other Circuits, see, e.g., United States 
v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422, 1422 n.1 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(collecting cases), and we adopt it as well.  Nor was the jury 
required to credit his alternate interpretation of the facts.    
Garner further contends there could not have been a 
conspiracy because details about the planned robbery—
including both the date on which it would occur and potentially 
also which bank would be robbed—were not final prior to 
Garner’s arrest.  Appellant’s Br. at 26.  But his discussions with 
Marshall, as well as with Saber, about that robbery all centered 
on Apex Bank.  Garner instructed Saber to surveil Apex, and, 
when Saber reported back, the three men discussed in detail 
their plan to rob it.  J.A. at 163–177; Supp. App. at 8–17, 29–
30.  This was enough to support the conspiracy charge. 
To prevail on a charge of attempted bank robbery, the 
Government had to prove that (1) Garner had the requisite 
intent to commit armed bank robbery; and (2) he “performed 
an act amounting to a ‘substantial step’ toward the commission 
of that crime.”  United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 (3d 
Cir. 1998); see also Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c).  He 
contends the evidence did not show any such substantial step, 
essentially because there were other necessary steps toward 
preparing the robbery he had not yet taken, such as acquiring a 
car.  But a defendant may commit an attempt even where he 
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stops short of “the last act necessary” for the actual commission 
of the crime.  United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 644 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 134 (2d 
Cir. 2003).  Here Garner engaged in numerous, and substantial, 
steps toward robbing Apex Bank, including sending Saber to 
surveil the location and gathering tools for the robbery.  
(Garner disputes the credibility of the testimony suggesting 
that he provided the bag of tools seized during his arrest, but 
the jury was not required to agree.)  Sufficient evidence thus 
backed the attempt charge. 
Finally, Garner’s sole argument as to the charge under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is that he cannot have possessed a firearm 
in furtherance of a crime of violence if he did not actually 
commit the underlying crime.  But because his challenges to 
the conspiracy and attempt charges fail, his challenge to the 
§ 924(c) charge fails as well. 
Thus we affirm.  
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